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8 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]  
SUBJECT : CIA Reserve Program

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Background

1. The following observations and recommendations are based on (1) a review of all the documents the reporting officers could find that deal with the origins and evolution of--or the rationale for--the Agency Reserve Program and (2) discussions with [REDACTED]

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2. It has long been recognized that the basic assumptions concerning the Agency's likely wartime role, capabilities, and military personnel requirements that prevailed at the time that the Command Relationships Agreement (CRA) was signed in 1955 are no longer valid. Indeed, for at least the last 15 years the history of the Agency Reserve Program has been one of frequent reappraisal and repeated efforts at accommodation to changes in the overall political and military environment. Since further adjustments are recommended below, it is important to make two points at the outset:

- However the CRA and the supplementary Memorandum of Understanding of 6 January 1967 may ultimately be modified in the light of recent trends and developments, the Agency will in all likelihood continue to be charged with unique wartime and "military contingency" responsibilities for furnishing various military commands with direct intelligence, psywar, communications, and unconventional

*\*These documents have been compiled in a separate file for ready reference. An annotated listing is presented at Tab A. A recent memorandum of conversation with [REDACTED] is presented at Tab B.*

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warfare support. It follows that if the need arises, execution of these responsibilities will be greatly facilitated if the Agency is able to call upon employees having both civilian and military qualifications.

- Partly because of this, and partly because of general satisfaction with the special projects work currently being undertaken by Agency Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps reservists, the Agency Reserve Program is not presently under challenge from CIA management. Nor is it being questioned by DoD.

3. It is not, therefore, the purpose of this memorandum to restate and analyze the arguments that have been advanced over the past few years to justify retaining the Agency Reserve Program. Rather, it is intended to highlight certain problem areas and to suggest ways in which the program can be improved.

#### Discussion and Recommendations

4. There is one problem that will remain intractable. Detailed planning for the mobilization assignments of individual Agency reservists simply is not practicable in advance of specific contingencies. The [redacted] will have to accept the fact that the personnel mobilization planning provisions of [redacted] were framed with this in mind. They will not be implemented and elaborated until a clear need arises.

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5. Hence, even though we know that the Agency is committed to using its reservists upon mobilization in duties requiring military status and proficiency, classical mobilization designee training will remain out of the question. Moreover, the actual mobilization of Agency reservists is likely to remain a relatively remote contingency.

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6. Recommendation 1: Under these circumstances, it would seem wise to restate the [REDACTED] mission to reflect both the multiplicity and necessarily general nature of its objectives. The revised mission would, of course, have to be approved by the Director of Personnel and the DDA. It might include the following points:

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- Enable CIA reservists to maintain their military status and proficiency.
- Enable CIA reservists to obtain the additional experience and skills that are likely to be necessary for the performance of their wartime duties.
- Furnish the CIA reservists' parent services with mutually beneficial direct project support in connection with their intelligence, operational, or administrative requirements.

7. Once the [REDACTED] mission has been redefined, the unit's training program should be adjusted accordingly. In general terms, more effort should be made to ensure that active duty tours serve one or another of our principal objectives. Greater emphasis should be placed on project work. The auditorium program should be modified to allow for one block of instruction that would relate directly to the roles that Agency reservists might be called upon to play in the event of mobilization. And consideration should be given to developing a specially-tailored two-week course that would give the participants a preliminary exposure to the type of environment in which they might be called upon to play a liaison or advisory role--either in Washington or elsewhere. These recommendations are spelled out in more detail below.

8. Recommendation 2: The largely ad hoc nature of the active duty tours served by Agency reservists is one of the weakest points of our training program. In aggregate, these tours yield the [REDACTED] and the reservists concerned some tangible benefits. Nonetheless, the returns would be higher--and most of the tours would

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be easier to justify--if they were generally more closely tied to the unit's mission. It is therefore recommended that a task force be formed, perhaps under the COS, to:

- Identify and secure regularly available spaces in those courses run by the armed services that best serve the [REDACTED] stated objectives.
- Arrange regular tours of duty with offices and headquarters where CIA reservists might serve--or maintain constant contact--in the event of mobilization.
- With due regard for the mandatory educational requirements and personal problems faced by the individual reservists, explore ways of encouraging [REDACTED] members to take the active duty tours the staff recommends.

9. Recommendation 3: If project work is made part of the [REDACTED] mission, responsibility for supervision of this effort should probably be assigned to a regular [REDACTED] staff officer. It is recommended that administration of the Special Projects Program and monitoring of the efforts of [REDACTED] and the Marine reservists be made the responsibility of the J-2 and that he be assigned as many assistants as he needs to help with this job. It is further recommended that every effort be made to expand the Special Projects Program and, in conjunction with the J-1, to offer as many incentives as possible for active and continued participation.

10. Recommendation 4: Continuation of the auditorium program would seem to be essential for a number of reasons. Moreover, its current broad focus should probably be retained. Nonetheless, some effort should be made to tie each year's program of instruction more closely to the units' mission. In particular, it is recommended that the J-5 consult with [REDACTED] the Office of Personnel, and such outside agencies as he deems appropriate with a view to the

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
regular inclusion in the annual auditorium program of one block of instruction that relates directly to the possible wartime responsibilities of Agency reservists.

11. Recommendation 5: To complement recommendations numbers 1 and 4, consideration should be given to designing a formal two-week course which, through lectures and field trips, would give the participants an understanding of--and contacts in--those offices or military headquarters where they may subsequently serve (either upon mobilization or on [REDACTED] arranged active duty tours).

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12. The recommendations advanced above will, for the most part, entail considerable effort to implement. Nonetheless, it is felt that they will result in a more valuable and more efficient Agency Reserve Program--and one that will be easier to justify if it is challenged in the future.

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Attachments:

Tab A: Annotated Listing

Tab B: Memorandum of Conversation

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7 February 1978

Tab A


Selected Chronology of the CIA Reserve Training Unit

May 1953



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This report briefly traces the history of the Agency reserve unit from the establishment of the Agency in September 1947 to mid-1953. In



This unit held 12 pay drills per year. When DA policy changed in 1950 so that it appeared that the [redacted] could be mobilized and used apart from the Agency, the [redacted] was deactivated and [redacted] was formed.

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1955

Command Relationship Agreement\*

This document issued under authority of NSCID 10/2 and NSCID 10/5 outlines the basic principles governing the "activities and military command relationships of the armed forces and CIA in the conduct of unconventional warfare in active theaters of war where American forces are engaged."

It was executed between the Agency and Joint Chiefs and it serves as the foundation for the special relationship enjoyed by the CIA military reserve organization.

<sup>o</sup> Denotes a source document that was attached to 1 April 1977 report concerning the [redacted] Training Program.

\* Denotes that source document is Top Secret.

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It is this document that outlines the formation of a [REDACTED], of which so much was made in the early 1960's.

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21 March 1956

Chronology of Negotiations with OSD on Military Manpower Requirements in Wartime.°

9 October 1958

Draft Briefing for the Career Council on Military Reserve Policies in CIA.°

This report prepared by the Chief of the Reserve Affairs Branch, then J. [REDACTED] is surprisingly contemporary for being almost 20 years old. The author squarely addresses the issues of the day including the concern expressed over the substantial Agency investment in a program of indeterminate value.

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This report merits a close reading and some consideration of the recommended actions would seem appropriate. How similar are the Agency military requirements of today to those of 1958?

6 May 1959

Excerpt from CIA Global War Plan for Clandestine Operations.\*

CIA reservists are classed as the Agency's "first source of qualified personnel" to meet its increased military manpower requirements.

16 June 1960

CIA Regulation [REDACTED] - Personnel Mobilization Planning.

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This Agency regulation prescribes policy for the wartime utilization and peacetime active duty training of members of CIA military reserve units.

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6 January 1961

Report of Reserve Advisory Committee on CIA-sponsored Military Reserve Training Program.

This report drafted in response to a series of questions from the Deputy Director (Support) including whether CIA should sponsor military reserve units, outlined the general policies that are still in effect in February, 1978. One notable exception is the recommendation against forming a joint military reserve unit.

23 April 1962

Reorganization for Training Purposes of the Military Reserve Program of CIA°

In this memorandum drafted by the Chief of Military Reserves Branch and sent by the DDS (L. K. White) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower, the Agency asked approval to form area training groups and concentrate its efforts on preparing Agency reservists for a role in "either covert denied or overt limited warfare." The memorandum is noteworthy for its candidness in describing the ongoing reserve training program as one of studying "the organization and functioning of US Allied and Enemy Military Forces."

7 June 1962

Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower concurs in Agency proposal of 23 April 1962.°

29 March 1965

Implementation of CRA in Military Contingencies

This War Plans Staff handbook outlines how the Command Relationships Agreement might be brought into effect. MMPD is one of the Agency units that would be alerted during periods of increased tension.

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21 July 1965

Short History of the Agency Military Reserve Program°

A synopsis of the foregoing history by [REDACTED]

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6 January 1967  
(as revised on  
21 May 1968)

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense for Mutual Support in Contingency Situations Short of War.

This is a general statement of the division of responsibilities between CIA and DOD for "specific contingency operations." It notes that [REDACTED]

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1 July 1967

Excerpt from [REDACTED]

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This document indicates that the DCI will recall CIA reservists and assign [REDACTED]

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11 July 1968

CIA Military Reserve Program°

This anonymous history goes over the familiar ground of Agency reserve history from 1955 through 1962. Then, however, it notes that from 1964 to 1967, the training program concentrated on counter-insurgency. In 1967-68 the emphasis was upon CIA's role in support of US military commitments. The program for 1968-69 marked the beginning of a training phase that continues to this day when it concerned the dual objectives: "analyze the nature of national power and determine the influence of economic, scientific, political, and military resources upon national security."

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23 December 1970

Staff Study: Should the Agency-sponsored military reserve training program be continued?°

[REDACTED] then deputy chief of MMPD, wrote this succinct analysis of the Agency reserve program in 1970. He concluded that the original rationale for the unit, i.e. that the Agency would have substantial military personnel requirements in the event of war, no longer obtained.

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He noted, however, that the Agency did receive some tangible benefits from the program and he recommended that OP do an in-depth study before the Agency decided to cancel the program.

1 March 1971

Review of Agency Mobilization Requirements for Military Personnel°

This rather curt letter from the DDP advises the Director of Personnel that agency mobilization requirements for military personnel ought not to be raised with the military.

18 December 1972

Manpower Requirements for MMPD°

[REDACTED] Chief of MMPD, argues for maintaining the size of the division at [REDACTED] to support the [REDACTED] military personnel assigned to the Agency and the [REDACTED] Agency reservists.

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He repeats several of the arguments from his 1970 study, but relies most heavily on two: a) the availability of personnel who can assume [REDACTED] and b) the cross-fertilization resulting from reservists serving tours with the military services and in DoD.

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3 April 1973

Staff Study To Determine Whether The Agency-sponsored Military Reserve Training Program Should Be Retained.°

This study done by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is essentially an expansion of the study he did on the same subject in December 1970. At this time, however, he recommends that the Agency unit be retained and suggests that Agency reservists be considered for mobilization in roles other than as unconventional warriors and he mentions service on the IC Staff as one possible alternative.

1 August 1974

CIA Reserve Program: The Gambino Report°

This is the so-called Gambino Report, commissioned after Director of Personnel, Jack Blake, raised several searching questions concerning the value of the reserve program to the Agency. Using the 1973 report by [REDACTED] as its primary basis and appealing to an oral endorsement from DDCI General Walters, Gambino concluded that the reserve program was worthwhile, principally because of the intangible benefits the Agency realized from it.

2 August 1974

Memorandum Forwarding the Gambino Report to the Director of Personnel°

Memorandum from [REDACTED] forwarding the Gambino report to the Director of Personnel, now Fred Janney.

1 November 1974

Memorandum from Director of Personnel to Deputy Director of Administration, Recommending Adoption of Gambino Report's Conclusion°

This comment on the Gambino Report by Janney recommends that the Agency Reserve Program be retained. It argues that for the cost of \$25,000/year the

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Agency does get some enhanced training for its members that are reservists and that [REDACTED] has been useful from time to time. The advantages to the Services are more difficult to demonstrate although the Special Projects Program is a great help in that direction.

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20 June 1975

A Short History of Agency-Sponsored Reserve Training Units and Programs

This document was drafted by LTC [REDACTED] in response to a request by [REDACTED] to trace the history of the [REDACTED] with emphasis upon the rationale for its special status.

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1 April 1977

Memorandum to [REDACTED] Concerning The [REDACTED] Training Program

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This report, which includes a selective chronology of the history of the [REDACTED] was done by Maj. [REDACTED] behest. It contains several recommendations all of which argue for a revalidation by DOD of the [REDACTED] status and objectives.

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27 April 1977

CIA Headquarters Regulation [REDACTED] Personnel

The Agency Manpower Mobilization Reserve system described in paragraph 14 of this regulation provides the Agency with manpower to implement war plans and designate the Director of Personnel as the official responsible for planning for the use of Agency reservists in wartime.

27 September 1977

Suggested Talking Points and Background for the DCI's Address to the Agency Reservists on 17 October 1977.

Prepared by [REDACTED] OP/EA.

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The package for Admiral Turner contains:

- a) three suggested topics for presentation
- b) a one-page statement of the Agency reserve program explaining its purpose and current practice
- c) a brief description of the composition of Agency units.

15 October 1977

Wartime Utilization of Agency Military Reservists

A memorandum written by the Deputy Chief of [REDACTED] Plans Branch in which he outlines the current DDO interpretation of the likely result of activation of CIA war plans with emphasis on the European theater.

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5 February 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Future [REDACTED] Cooperation: Conversation  
with [REDACTED]

Background

1. The reporting officer initiated contact with [REDACTED] in mid-1977 when he learned that that office had been assigned primary responsibility for monitoring and implementing the Agency's residual war planning effort. His purpose was to locate additional documents relating to the wartime utilization of Agency military reservists and to determine whether any changes were contemplated in either the basic Command Relationships Agreement (CRA) or the Memorandum of Understanding of 1967 that might affect the status and mission of the [REDACTED]. It was also his intention to gauge the advisability and feasibility of collaborating with [REDACTED] a renewed effort to tie in some portion of the [REDACTED] training program directly to existing Agency-JCS and Agency-DoD contingency plans and agreements.

2. Not surprisingly, the [REDACTED] inquiries and overtures were welcomed by [REDACTED] files were made available for review, and [REDACTED] prepared a memorandum for the Commander, [REDACTED] in which he presented his understanding of how Agency reservists would be utilized under the CRA and the Agency's various war plans. [REDACTED] also quickly endorsed the idea of working with the [REDACTED] to develop a series of auditorium lectures on the sort of roles that Agency reservists might be called upon to play under the CRA or the 1967 MOU, and to locate opportunities for complementary two-week active duty tours.

3. Despite early optimism on the part of [REDACTED] however, little progress was recorded during the past eight months toward resolution of the basic question of whether or not major changes will be made in the Agency's agreed

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2. [REDACTED] 019641

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Comments


5. Since high level attention has been focused on Agency plans, capabilities, and obligations in the event of general or limited hostilities, it is reasonable to assume that some new guidelines will be laid down before too long. Because [REDACTED] has a major stake in the outcome of this process, it may be somewhat too ready to believe that little will in fact be changed. But even if sweeping revisions are ultimately made in the CRA and the 1967 MOU, the Agency will very likely continue to be charged with responsibility for providing some direct intelligence, psywar, communications, and unconventional warfare support to major military commands in specified contingency situations.

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6. In any event, the prospect of change should not deter efforts to include an analytical treatment of the nature and implications (for Agency reservists) of existing contingency plans and mechanisms in the [REDACTED] Training Program. Three or four lectures could be usefully devoted to this topic next year. Depending on the pace and extent of change, nearly as many might be called for each year thereafter. Moreover, since any changes in these contingency plans are virtually certain to be quickly reflected in the design and conduct of major joint military exercises like [REDACTED] [REDACTED] such exercises will probably continue to offer particularly valuable opportunities for complementary active duty training.

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